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THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER GROUPS: 
A COMPARATIVE VIEW 
L.H. Leigh* 
In recent years, economic, or white-collar, crime has attracted 
widespread interest in both America and Europe. Increasingly, we 
are exhorted to tum our attention from the problems of street crime 
to those of corporate crime. Corporate crime involves vast sums; it 
can prejudice not only the financial interests of citizens, but also 
their lives and their property; it can thwart important state policies, 
such as controlling pollution, fostering competition, and protecting 
consumers. These pressures are felt throughout the industrialized 
world. It is not surprising, therefore, that corporate criminal liability 
has been discussed extensively by scholars who have addressed the 
problem of economic crime. Corporate criminal liability1 is one 
method by which states seek to control business activities, a method 
that dates back, at least in the United States, to the passage of the 
Sherman Act of 1890.2 It is currently being advocated in Europe as 
a means to control the excesses of economically powerful entities.3 • 
Yet not all scholars agree that corporate criminal liability is the best 
means of achieving such control, and those who concede its value do 
not necessarily agree that all corporate wrongdoing should be penal-
ized criminally.4 
In this Article, I propose to survey the status of corporate and 
* Reader in Law, University of London (London School of Economics and Political Sci-
ence). B.A. 1957, Alberta; LL.B. 1958, Alberta; Ph.D. 1966, London. - Ed. 
I. Although there is a substantial body of legal writing that proceeds on the assumption 
that there is such a thing as corporate crime, notorious ambiguities of usage need to be ex• 
amined. What for instance is meant by "corporate" qi.me? In some usages it clearly does not 
connote that criminal liability may be ascribed to a corporation, but refers to such further 
matters as the conditions of ascription and how they relate to the realities of the corporate 
entity as some scholars see them. Corporate criminal liability as a method of control also calls 
into question fundamental values pertaining to the personal character of guilt and punishment, 
as well as functional questions of effectiveness. 
2. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). 
3. See, e.g., La Responsibilita Penale .Delle Persone Giuridiche in DIRITIO COMUNITARIO 
99-100 (University of Messina ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MESSINA SYMPOSIUM] (remarks 
by Faure); Delmas-Marty & Tiedemann, La Criminalite, le droit penal et /es mullinalionales, 
1979 Juris-Classeur Periodique, la semaine juridique, [J.C.P.J II No. 53, at 1-2935. 
4. See Orland, Rejlections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 
17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501 (1979-1980). 
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group liability in Europe and in the common-law countries, and to 
examine the alternative methods of control devised in various legal 
systems. In most European countries, the rule is that societas delin-
quere non potest .5 Certain countries, for example, Italy and West 
Germany, have constitutional provisions that preclude corporate 
guilt.6 In other systems, the same arguments that originally impeded 
the development of corporate criminal liability in the common-law 
countries have simply had a more pervasive and lasting influence. 
These arguments may be summarized quickly: a corporation has no 
mind of its own and therefore cannot entertain guilt; it has no body 
and therefore cannot act in propria persona; punishing it would vio-
late the fundamental principle that punishment must be imposed 
only on the actual offender; the regime of penalties does not contem-
plate possible corporate offenders; and, :finally, procedures such as 
instruction ( or rehabilitation) are not well adapted toward dealing 
with corporate entities.7 These difficulties have been overcome in 
common-law countries, but not always convincingly in European 
eyes. 
Yet, fundamental as some of these objections appear to be, they 
have not inhibited the Netherlands from moving toward a full meas-
ure of corporate guilt, nor have they completely barred reform in 
other countries such as Finland, Poland, Norway, and France.8 
Even in Spain, reforms of this sort have been envisaged.9 And while 
common-law and European systems start from first principles that 
are diametrically opposed, they often arrive in practice at a structure 
of liability that produces broadly similar answers to the problems of 
corporate crime. The coverage achieved by a system of administ:ca-
tive offenses, or by a system that permits corporations to be :fined as a 
5. I stress modern developments because most European systems recognized forms of cor-
porate liability until the time of the French Revolution, examples being liability imposed on 
cilies for rebellion and riot in European countries, and upon the hundred in English law for 
failure to maintain public works. But on the continent, this liability disappeared. To some 
continental jurists, corporate criminal liability, which we consider to be a response to problems 
thrown up by the modern industrialized state, appears medieval. See Huss, La Responsabilite 
penale des personnes morales, in MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 351. For the history of 
the topic in Continental systems, see Barbero Santos, Responsabilidad penal de las personas 
juridicas, in MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 454-58. For a history of corporate liability 
in the common law, see L. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH 
LAW 1-2 (1969). 
6. See MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 599 (remarks by Lupo); Screvens, Les sanc-
tions appl(cables aux personnes morales, in MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 179-80. 
7. See Huss, supra note 5. 
8. See Delmas-Marty, La Res_ponsabilite Penale de Grou_pements, REVUE INTERNATIONALE 
DE DROIT PENAL, Sae annee, Nouvelle Serie, le et 2e Trimestre (1980). 
9. See Barbero· Santos, supra note 5; Yafiez Roman, Revis/a de Libros y de Revistas, in 25 
ANUARIO DE DERECHO PENAL Y CIENCIAS PENALES, (1972.) 
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secondary party or assessed damages as a civil consequence of a 
crime, or by one that contains provisions imposing corporate liability 
only for certain offenses, for example, may differ little from that 
achieved under a system of full corporate liability.10 But the theoret-
ical objections noted above continue to affect profoundly the struc-
ture of proposed reforms. 
Brie.fly, three positions concerning corporate liability may be 
identified. First, there are systems of full corporate criminal liability, 
such as those in England and the United States. Second, there are 
systems that recognize only partial corporate criminal liability, for 
example Denmark, Belgium, and France. Finally, some systems do 
not permit such liaoility at all, or permit it only under the guise of 
administrative offenses. Italy and West Germany afford examples of 
this restrictive view of corporate liability. 
This Article will sketch each of these positions in some detail, 
beginning, in Part I, with those systems that authorize full liability. 
Part II discusses systems that presently fall within the second cate-
gory noting'some recent suggestions for broader liability. Part III 
deals with systems that provide for only administrative liability, out-
lining the sanctions developed under those systems. In Part IV, I 
briefly summarize the sanctions directed against individual corpo-
rate directors and officers in all of these systems.11 . 
I. SYSTEMS OF FULL CORPORATE LIABILITY 
Full corporate criminal liability developed first in a modem form 
in the United States and Canada, then in England, and more re-
cently in the Netherlands. In systems having full corporate criminal 
liability, the general rule is that all corporations are criminally liable 
without limitation as to type. In the Netherlands, for example, liabil-
ity is expressly imposed on corporations by Article SI of the Crimi-
nal Code.12 So wide is the rule in most common-law jurisdictions 
that even state corporations may be convicted of offenses, 13 although 
this extension has been vigorously criticized.14 Where jurisprudence 
10. Belgium and France provide examples. See Screvens, supra note 6. 
11. I do not ignore the need for socioeconomic analysis of contemporary problems that the 
method of corporate liability has been devised to meet, in part at least, but that must be the 
concern of further scholarship. In the confines of this paper, my concern must be primarily 
legal. 
12. See Fasseur, Tlte Criminal Liability ef Legal Persons in Netherlands Law, in MESSINA 
SYMPOSIUM. supra note 3, at 309. 
13. E.g., Rex v. Yorkshire Blee. Board, The Times (London), Nov. 17, 19S1 at 3, col. 3. 
14. Professor Glanville Williams suggests that the net effect is simply to penalize the public 
at large. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART 864 (2d ed. 1961). M. Huss, 
relying on a jurisprudential view long since rejected in England, considers that as such corpo-
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of an antique sort still has its day is seen in respect of the question 
whether bodies that the law has not endowed with corporate status 
may be treated as legal persons for the purpose of prosecution. In 
some systems the problem has been resolved by legislation that spec-
ifies which unincorporated bodies may be so treated. This is true in 
England for some offenses involving trade unions. Is And a recent 
attempt to recodify the federal criminal law in the United States 
would permit almost any organization to be held criminally liable. I 6 
In general, however, one must look to the details of particular state 
and federal laws to determine whether an entity that does not enjoy 
corporate status is a legal entity. 
In determining whether a corporation may be criminally liable, 
one must also consider the problem of ultra vires acts by corporate 
employees. It is generally accepted in England and in the United 
States that a company founded for lawful purposes may nonetheless 
commit crimes. The solution in English law, where the ultra vires 
rule is strict, is that the crime may be imputed to the company where 
its activity falls within the class of activities permitted by its objects 
clause. I7 In Europe, the general rule is the same, but commentators 
have difficulty visualizing how a company that was formed for com-
mercial purposes could be held liable for offenses foreign to the cor-
porate purpose. Is This in turn is reflected in the view, fairly widely 
held, that only commercial and industrial corporations should be 
held criminally liable and then only for economic offenses. I9 
Under a system of full corporate criminal liability, however, 
there is no reason why criminal prosecution of corporations should 
be limited to economic offenses. Provided that will and act can .be 
rations are not the creature of a number of persons coming together, that they could not them-
selves have a collective will capable of entertaining guilt Huss, supra note 5, at 371. Neither 
criticism is persuasive, though both are suggestive. In those countries that accord indepen-
dence of activities to state corporations, it would not be sufficient simply to admonish officers 
of such corporations through governmental channels; the fact of a criminal conviction may 
cause such corporations to take remedial action in the same way as a privately owned corpora-
tion would. As to the second criticism, in England at least, it is now accepted that there is no 
theory of corporate personality; the law recognizes as a corporation an entity that the legisla-
ture endows with the attributes of corporate status. Hart, JJf!finition and Theory in Jurispru-
dence, 70 L.Q. REv. 37 (1954). A corporation without members has, nonetheless, directors 
who think and act for it, and whose intention may be treated as criminal and imputable to the 
corporation. 
15. See Trade Unions Act, 1871, 34 Viet. ch. 3 §§ 15-16. 
16. Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111, 125 CONG. 
REc. 12,203 (1979). See S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1980). 
17. See L. LEIGH, supra note 5, at 46-51. 
18. See Delmas-Marty, supra note 8. 
19. See, e.g., Delatte, La Responsahilite Penale des Personnes Morales, in MESSINA SYMPO-
SIUM, supra note 3, at 306. 
' 
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attributed to a corporation, there is nothing, in theory, to prevent a 
corporation from being held liable for an offense of violence such as 
murder. It is clear that the general rule permits liability for man-
slaughter, especially where death is attributable to an omission 
rather than to an unlawful_ act.20 While the Ford Motor Company 
was acquitted of manslaughter charges arising out of defects in the 
design and positioning of the Pinto's gasoline tank, the acquittal was 
on the merits and was not based on any view that the corporation 
could not be convicted of manslaughter as a matter oflaw.21 Perhaps 
the spectral mind seems less incongruous than the spectral hand. 
Even for the narrow class of offenses in which attribution of an act to 
the corporation is tlieoretically impossible - e.g., rape, bigamy, and 
the self-administration of a noxious drug to procure an abortion - a 
corporation might still be charged as an accessory to the crime. 22 
What is not clear, however, is whether courts in any of those sys-
tems that permit corporate criminal liability would enunciate exemp-
tions from liability based on views of public policy, or the 
incongruity of convicting corporations for certain crimes, or both. 
The incongruity, if any, in convicting a corporation for an act of 
violence reflects an inarticulable premise that conditions of policy, 
especially deterrence, require the prosecution of natural persons. It 
also undoubtedly reflects a common sense reaction to the problem of 
attributing a physical act to the corporation. Yet the accepted theory 
as readily permits attribution of act as of mind. 
Of course, theory is one thing, practice another. In systems that 
permit corporate criminal liability, corporations are seldom con-
VIcted of traditional crimes of violence. In general, corporations are 
held liable for crimes that are closely related to their business activi-
ties. 23 In the United State~, conspiracy in restraint of trade is a par-
20. Rex v. East Crest Oil Co., (1944] 3 D.L.R. 535 (Alta. Sup. Ct., App. Div.), revd on otl,er 
grounds, East Crest Oil Co. v. The King, (1945] 2 D.L.R. 353 (Sup. Ct. Can.); Union Colliery 
Co. v. The Queen, 31 S.C.R. 81 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1900). For the United States, see People v. 
Ebasco Servs., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 789, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (although corporation 
cannot be the victim of a homicide, it may commit that offense and be held to answer therefor). 
21. See V. Swigert & R. Farrell, Corporate Homicide: .Definitional Processes in the Control 
of .Deviance, IS LAW & Socv. REv. 161 (1980-1981). 
22. See The Law Commission (England), Published Working Paper No. 44, ~ 37 (June 30, 
1972). Related to these cases where attribution is impossible is a heterogeneous collection of 
offenses couched in terms that are apt to impose liability only on natural persons. Among 
these are homicide offenses where the statute defines the homicide as the killing of one human 
being by another. The Queen v. Murray Wright Ltd., (1970] N.Z.L.R. 476 (C.A.); People v. 
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102 (1909). 
23. Although offenses by corporations are linked to the business activities of the corpora-
tion, it is not possible to categorize them formally in any other way. In the Netherlands, liabil-
ity originally was imposed for economic offenses as listed, rather than defined, by statute. This 
was found to be undesirable because it was not inclusive enough. Although most instances of 
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adigm case.24 Other recent examples include fraud,25 filing 
erroneous reports with government,26 bribery and corruption,27 and 
extortion by a collection agency.28 In Britain, convictions are regis-
tered for fraud and for conspiracies to off end against regulatory leg-
islation. 29 Canada presents a picture similar to the United States.30 
Where acts of violence are involved, prosecutors tend to charge natu-
ral persons alone unless there is clear evidence that such violence 
was inflicted pursuant to corporate business policy. One reason un-
derlying such prosecutorial charging decisions is that to prosecute a 
corporation successfully the state must attribute to the corporation 
the will and acts of its agents. Here common-law systems have made 
a distinct contribution, overcoming the problem that corporations 
can neither think nor act by themselves. They have done so in differ-
ent ways, depending on the extent to which courts are required to 
search for some attribute of corporateness in attributing responsibil-
ity. This, in turn, leads to the secondary problem of distinguishing 
between a corporation's own liability and its vicarious liability for 
the acts of agents or employees acting in the course of their employ-
ment. If a wide test of attribution is chosen, it may be difficult to 
rebut the accusation that an enterprise is in effect being subjected to 
vicarious liability. But vicarious liability for serious crime is at vari-
corporate crime concern what is loosely referred to as socioeconomic legislation, there are 
cases that fall outside its ambit that, as Dr. Fasseur remarks, cannot be excluded in principle: 
"It is conceivable that a legal person may be accused of culpable homicide, e.g. a pharmaceuti-
cal company which markets a product that is harmful to health or a transport undertaking 
which uses defective vehicles and causes an accident as a result." Fasseur, supra note 12, at 
314. As it was impracticable to list those offenses for which a corporation might be liable, the 
Netherlands Criminal Code now contains a general principle of liability. Parenthetically, it 
may be remarked that the notion of economic crime, which is certainly fashionable in Europe 
at present, lacks cohesion. It is a catch-phrase only. The example given by Dr. Fasseur is of a 
crime that certainly doe~ not lack economic impact or si~cance. 
24. There are many recent cases; for a prominent example, see United States v. Hilton 
Hotel Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); see generally Reasons 
& Goff, Corporate Crime, A Cross-National Analysis in WHITE COLLAR CRIME, THEORY AND 
R.EsEARCH (G. Geis & E. Stotland eds. 1980). 
25. United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir. 1978). 
26. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978); note that 
the accused bodies were legal entities. 
27. United States v. Griffin, 401 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975). 
28. State v. Adjustment Dept. Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971). 
29. See L. LEIGH, supra note 5, at 51-52 (1969). 
30. Id.; Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups, 9 0TIAWA L. REv. 
246 (1977). In 1969, I concluded: 
In practice liability generally relates to certain types of commercial frauds or violations of 
regulatory legislation. Those traditional areas of the law in which corporations have ap-
peared as the accused, such as fraud or obscene libel, involved offences closely related to 
the business activities of the corporation. 
L. LEIGH, supra note 5, at 52. Nothing in the intervening years suggests that that summary was 
wrong. 
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ance with fundamental values embedded in both common-law and 
civil systems.31 Hence continental objections to corporate personal 
liability. 
English courts have adopted a formula that is intended to distin-
guish personal from vicarious liability. This is the doctrine of identi-
fication that, by a process of inversion, was treated as establishing 
that a corporation could have a mind capable of entertaining a crim-
inal intent. Viewed as a doctrine of ascription, the identification 
doctrine is consistent with all theories of corporate personality and 
with the accepted view that no such theory exists. As Viscount 
Haldane explained this doctrine in 1915: 
My Lords, a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own 
any more than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will 
must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who for some 
purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind 
and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality 
of the corporation. That person may be under the direction of share-
holders in general meeting, that person may be the board of directors 
itself, or it may be, and in some companies it is so, that the person has 
an authority co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him under 
the articles of association.32 
This formulation, the alter ego doctrine, underlies the English rule 
concerning the attribution of mental state to the corporation as a 
mental state personal to it. In the process, English courts treat the 
alter ego notion almost as if it asserted that a corporation has a mind 
and can will, whereas it originally served only as the basis on which 
a state of mind could be imputed to a corporation for the purposes of 
limiting civil liability. 
The alter ego notion has not been restricted to officers enjoying 
power by virtue of a corporate charter or by a delegation from the 
primary managerial organ. Rather courts have adapted the doctrine 
to take account of the realities of power in large, decentralized cor-
porations. The question is, had the individual actor been invested by 
proper authority with managerial power and responsibility over a 
significant aspect of the company's business? In other words, is he 
functionally independent of superior authority in respect of general 
management decisions in that sphere of activity in which he func-
tions?33 This formula dearly leaves a good deal of latitude to the 
31. See, e.g., Rex v. Huggins 92 Eng. Rep. 518 (1730). On English Law, see J. SMITH & B. 
HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 140-54 (4th ed. 1978). 
32. Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., [1915] A.C. 705, 713 (H.L.). See L. 
LEIGH, supra note 5, at ch. 3, for an account of the doctrine in practice, and id. at ch. 6, for a 
discussion of the relationship between corporate and vicarious liability. 
33. Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd. v. Nattrass, (1972] A.C. 153, 170 (H.L. 1971); see Regina v, 
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court or jury. Once the rule abandons the safety of insisting that the 
officer be designated as a governing organ of the corporation in its 
constituent documents, the line between vicarious and personal lia-
bility may be blurred.34 But English courts have also had to recog-
nize that if the magic circle is drawn too narrowly, the test for 
liability will not meet the realities of large-scale corporate organiza-
tions in which much primary authority will be bestowed on branch, 
area, and division managers.35 
In the United States the distinction between personal and vicari-
ous liability for corporations is more obscure.36 Most states appear 
to follow the high managerial agent formulation contained in the 
Model Penal Code.37 Under this standard, a corporation should not 
be held criminally liable "unless such conduct was performed, au-
thorized, ratified, adopted or tolerated by the corporation's directors, 
Andrews-Weatherfield Ltd., [1972] 1 W.L.R. 118 (C.A. 1971); Regina v. Sporle, [1971] CRIM. 
L. REV. 706; the Canadian rule is virtually the same: Regina v. St. Lawrence Corp., S D.L.R. 
3d 263 (Ont. C.A. 1969). 
34. It is not clear whether identification may be resisted on the ground that the officer in 
question intended to benefit himself rather than the corporation. There is early, but unsatis-
factory authority that even where the company is the officer's victim, it may still be liable for 
any offense that he causes it to co=it in the process. In Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd., [1944] 2 All 
E.R. SIS, the company was thus held liable for a fraud committed on the revenue, even though 
the revenue fraud was a consequence of a fraud perpetrated on the company by its comptrol-
ler. This is hardly satisfactory. Civilly, a company would not be considered to be a party to a 
fraud on a third party where it arose from a fraud committed by its director on it. See Bel-
mont Fin. Corp. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (No. 1) [1979] Ch. 250 (C.A. 1977). The American 
rule by which a corporation is not held liable where its employee or officer acted with intent to 
defraud it seems preferable and may yet co=end itself to an English court. Certainly Cana-
dian courts would not identify the officer's act with the corporation in such circumstances. 
Regina v. Howard Smith Paper Mills, Ltd., [1954] Ont. R. 543. In the United States, see 
United States v. Harry L. Young, Inc., 464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972); notes 46-48 iefra and 
accompanying text. 
35. Dr. Glanville Williams concludes that in respect of crimes of mens rea it does not much 
matter whether the notion of the "inner circle" is restricted since the purposes of deterrence are 
generally best served by prosecuting the natural persons responsible. G. WILLIAMS, TEXT-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 949 (1978). In an English context this is persuasive enough since 
antitrust is not punishable criminally, and, in respect of most other offenses, it does not seem 
unduly difficult to pinpoint the directing author of the wrong. Indeed, it is difficult to see why 
the company is prosecuted as well. On the other hand, he argues, the formulation restricts the 
liability of a corporation for crimes of negligence since negligence by, for example a branch 
manager of a shop, should be imputable to the company as its negligence. Id This, with 
respect, misconceives the legislation in issue in the negligence cases, for its purpose was to give 
defense to a company that would have been liable vicariously had it not used all due diligence 
to prevent infractions by its employees. The real question in the case of Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L. 1971), was whether the company was conclusively fixed 
with the negligence of its manager as its alter ego, or whether it was prima facie vicariously 
liable, subject to a showing that it had instituted a proper system of control. The latter was 
held to be the case. · 
36. See generally Elkins, Corpora/ions and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. 
LJ. 73 (1976). 
37. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 207 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Of course a corporation can 
be strictly or vicariously liable for the fault of its agents or menial employees. 
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officers or other 'high managerial agents' who are sufficiently high in 
the corporate hierarchy to warrant the assumption that their acts in 
some substantial sense reflect corporate policy."38 Not surprisingly, 
the president of a corporation is a high managerial agent for the pur-
poses ofthis rule. 39 It is apparently not necessary that the president 
or board of directors knew of the offense; it is enough that an agent, 
invested with authority over the relevant aspect of the corporation's 
activities, authorized or acquiesced in the offense.40 
In general, corporate criminal liability for federal offenses does 
not follow the "high managerial agent" formulation used by most 
states. The rule for most offenses is that a corporation can be liable 
for the act of any employee where that employee was acting in the 
course of his employment. This is the formulation advanced in sec-
tion 402 of Senate Bill S. 1630, which is intended to codify existing 
- law.41 Under this proposed codification, a corporation would be 
held criminally liable for the acts of its agents in three situations: 
where liability is strict, where the criminal acts are those of an agent 
acting within the scope of his employment, and where the agent's 
acts fall within the scope of his authority.42 
The basic theory underlying the federal standard appears to be 
that the corporation owes a general duty to the public to ensure due 
enforcement of federal regulations, especially those pertaining to 
trade and commerce.43 The Brown Commission originally intended 
a high managerial agent formula to apply federally. Presumably, 
38. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33, 71 (1971). 
39. See, e.g., People v. Aquarian Age 2000 Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 545, (1976). 
40. Commonwealth v. Moraiti, 34 Pa. Commw. 27, 382 A.2d 997 (1978); West Valley Es-
tates, Inc. v. State, 286 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1973); State v. Adjustment Dept. Credit Bureau, Inc., 
483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971). 
41. § 402 Liability of an Organization for Conduct of an Agent 
Except as otherwise expressly provided, an organization is criminally liable for an 
offense if the conduct constituting the offense - (a) is conduct of its agent, and such 
conduct - (I) occurs in the performance of matters within the scope of the agent's em• 
ployment or authority and is intended by the agent to benefit the organization; or (2) is 
thereafter ratified or adopted by the organization; or (b) involves a failure by the organi-
zation or its agent to discharge a specific duty of conduct imposed on the organization by 
law. 
S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 402 (1981) (Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981). 
42. S. REP. No. 553, S11pra note 16, at 81. 
Recently, some federal courts appear to have doubted this formulation. It is still the ac-
cepted doctrine, but in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir,), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), the court doubted whether the knowledge of a menial employee 
would be sufficient to impose liability on the corporation, and similar doubts are expressed in 
at least one other federal case. United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 
1975). See Elkins, S11pra note 36. It does seem clear that few, if any, cases in fact impose 
liability in respect of the state of mind of menial employees. 
43. S. REP. No. 553, Sllpra note 16, at 80-81. 
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this was rejected because of the exigencies of enforcement. The pro-
posed formula and the present law are consistent in their emphasis 
on enforcement of the law within an organization by the organiza-
tion itself. The organization is thus required to supervise the appli-
cation and enforcement of regulatory legislation intemally.44 
American law does, however, limit liability where the human ac-
tor was nol acting within the scope of bis employment or authority 
and did not intend to benefit the corporation. Indeed, some courts 
run the two concepts together, concluding that an agent who did not 
intend to benefit the corporation was not acting within the scope of 
bis employment or authority.45 What matters is whether the acts 
were intended to benefit the corporation, not whether they benefited 
the corporation in fact. If the acts were done with that intent, the 
corporation may be held liable, even though the acts were done in 
defiance of express corporate policy.46 Underlying this rule is the 
notion that the corporation must itself ensure that its employees and 
agents adhere to the law, coupled with the assumption that manage-
ment is usually aware of violations.47 
If the state can attribute the acts and will of employees or agents 
to a corporation, the corporation will rarely be exculpated on the 
ground that the penalty for the offense cannot be imposed on it. In 
England, murder and treason apart, all crimes may be punished with 
a fine. In other common-law jurisdictions and in the United States, 
violators can be fined for most offenses, and American corporations 
44. It may well be that the fact that the federal government ·is not the primary criminal 
lawmaking authority in the United States (with obvious exceptions) influenced federal courts, 
interpreting legislation founded on the commerce clause for example, to lay down a broad rule 
of responsibility that is permeated with concepts of vicarious liability. The vicissitudes of mens 
rea in federal courts would certainly be consistent with this theory. Thus, in United States v. 
Hilton Hotel Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), the court held 
that the Sherman Act is directed at results, not intent. See generally S. REP. No. 553, supra 
note 16, at 59-69. Uniquely, perhaps, American law holds that elements of knowledge pos-
sessed by different employees and agents of the same corporation may be combined to achieve 
a guilty mind. Inland Freightlines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951); United 
States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974); cf. Law Commission Work-
ing Paper, supra note 22 at 1[ 39( d). The doctrine may be limited to awareness of circumstances 
rather than to purpose since that seems to be the context in which the matter has arisen. It is 
more consistent with liability for failure to supervise, than with mens rea liability for tradi-
tional crimes. 
45. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1969). 
46. United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1941); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d at 878; Belcher v. Birmingham 
Trust Natl. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala.), stay denied, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1978). 
In some cases, however, it may be possible to infer an intention not to benefit the corpora-
tion from the actor's disregard of corporate policy. Beusch, 596 F.2d at 878. 
47. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1125 (1973). 
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may be placed on probation.48 Apart from this, a wide spectrum of 
possible sanctions exists, injunction, quo warranto, dissolution, di-
vestiture, closure of premises, and disqualification orders against di-
rectors who are responsible for the commission of criminal offenses 
through the medium of the corporation.49 The general rule, where a 
fine as well as imprisonment is available, is that the legislature in-
tends that the corporation shall be liable so far as it can be. so 
In short, common-law countries recognize a wide measure of cor-
porate criminal liability even though there are important differences 
in the rules concerning attribution of fault. These differences reflect 
the various compromises reached in each country between the dic-
tates of venerable legal principles and the need to enforce much 
modem socioeconomic legislation. The general principle of corpo-
rate liability is well-established, however, as is the rule that corporate 
guilt in no way eliminates the personal guilt of the natural person to 
whom the offense may be attributed; he remains liable throughout.51 
There may, of course, be cases where corporate guilt does not de-
pend on identification of the guilty off ender, not only those involving 
strict liability, but offenses of omission as well. If the offense re-
quires mens rea, however, it would be difficult to convict, in England 
at least, if it could not be shown that a high managerial officer ought 
to have known of the circumstances triggering the duty to act and 
culpably failed to do so. With all this in mind, we may now tum to 
those systems that permit only a measure of corporate criminal 
liability. 
II. SYSTEMS OF PARTIAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
A number of European systems recognize various forms of cor-
porate criminal liability, either directly or indirectly. In all of these 
systems, however, the natural person is primarily responsible. In 
Belgium, for example, the natural person is liable, and, in the case of 
omissions, liability rests on those persons who were responsible for 
preventing the infraction. Here, of course, the laws deal largely with 
48. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
J.C. Ehrlich Co., 372 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1974). See Coffee, "No Soul To Damn: No Body 
To Kick'!· An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 19 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 448-57 (1981). 
49. See Coffee, supra note 48; Leigh, supra note 30 at 294-98. 
SO. See People v. Charter Thrift & Loan, 30 Cal. App. 3d 412, 106 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1973), 
and cases cited therein. 
51. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962) (dealing with criminal antitrust liabil-
ity); Regina v. Sheridan, [1972] 9 C.C.C. 2d 545 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); Dellow v. Busby, [1942] 2 All 
E.R. 439 (K.B.). 
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fiscal and social security matters. It is thus necessary to ask who 
performs what tasks on behalf of the company. As Professor Delatte 
has observed, the principle of imputability of the corporate fault to 
the individual requires a factual inquiry into who was really at fault, 
and that person need not be an organ of the company. 52 The rule of 
personal responsibi)ity also applies in France, particularly for acts 
that tend to harm the corporation itself. In the absence of any special 
provision in the law, the directors or presidents are personally liable 
for public welfare offenses imputable to their corporations. 53 The 
directors, under this doctrine, must prevent infractions from occur-
ring. In respect, however, of the serious offense of abus de biens 
sociaux - in effect the diversion of corporate assets - directors are 
held liable only where they were aware of the facts. 54 Where the 
object of the legislation is to protect third parties or the interests of 
society at large, Professors Levasseur and Bouloc believe that corpo-
rate responsibility would be a just solution, but there, too, the gen-
eral rule of corporate nonresponsibility remains in force. 
In a number of European countries, special legislation makes 
corporations (and sometimes any other employer) liable criminally 
for a wide range of public welfare or quasi-criminal offenses. Such 
liability is often considered to be less than truly criminal because the 
offenses to which it relates are found outside the Criminal Code. 
This is true in Denmark, for example, where the common cases in-
clude licensees of public houses, restaurants and hotels, and offenses 
under motor vehicles legislation. There is also a tradition of holding 
owners of businesses liable for offenses concerning fiscal matters like 
filing false income tax returns. Smuggling, however, is regarded as a 
particularly serious offense requiring personal guilt. Similarly, own-
ers, including corporate owners of workplaces, can be held strictly 
liable for offenses concerning the safety of the workplace. But em-
ployers' liability applies only to the most serious offenses; when the 
offense is less serious, workmen of superior status, such as foremen, 
may be charged. As to the types of entities liable, companies having 
legal persons, including some public corporations, can be convicted 
of such offenses, but partnerships generally can not. 55 
In Belgian law, corporations may not be criminally convicted, 
52. Delatte, supra note 19, at 283. 
53. See Levasseur & Bouloc, La Responsabilite Penale Des Personnes Morales d'Apres Le 
Droit Posit!/ Fram;ais Actuel, in MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 197, 209. 
54. Id. at 210 n.33. The directors appear to be personally liable even in some of these cases 
- for example, where the entity passes a bad check. 
55. See Garde, The Penal Responsibility of Judicial Persons in Danish Law, in MESSINA 
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 321. 
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but they may be affected indirectly by fines against the persons in 
charge who may then be indemnified by the company.56 A corpora-
tion may also be declared civilly liable for the acts of such persons, 
and while the common penalty imposed is a fine, the sanction may 
comprehend seizure of the assets of the corporation. (Under Belgian 
law, moreover, certain penal sanctions can be imposed on corporate 
bodies; the country's price-fixing legislation, for example, provides 
that if an organ or agent of the corporation is responsible for the 
infraction as principal or accessory, its business may be closed.57) 
And, as with most European countries, the prosecution can obtain 
orders disqualifying the natural persons responsible for certain of-
fenses from managing a particular type of business or from manag-
ing any business whatever. 
French law contains a number of exceptional provisions, gener-
ally pertaining to the field of public welfare offenses, that permit the 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations. Examples include 
laws concerning tax fraud, foreign exchange offenses, and price-
fixing. In respect of safety-at-work legislation, the corporation may 
be convicted where fault cannot be imputed to a natural person.58 
Similar provisions are contained in the Labor Code. Most striking 
are the provisions in cartel legislation that clearly provide for corpo-
rate criminal responsibility. Recently, the French Parliament, influ-
enced by the example of the European Economic Community, 
whose rules are enforced und(?r pecuniary sanctions, instituted a re-
gime under which enterprises that operate as cartels or abuse a dom-
inant position may be fined pursuant to a reasoned decision by the 
_Department of Economic Affairs.59 Yet this sanction, though heavy, 
is administrative in character. Professors Levasseur and Bouloc; not-
ing that offenses concerning cartels are criminal in character, regret 
that the government, to secure the responsibility of corporate bodies, 
limited itself to administrative sanctions.60 They concluded that al-
though government is aware of the need to respond adequately to 
economic abuses of this nature by large corporations, they hesitate to 
cross the Rubicon and impose full corporate criminal liability.61 The 
scattered provisions in French law providing for corporate liability 
56. See Delatte, supra note 19. 
51. See id at 292-93. 
58. See Levasseur & Bouloc, supra note 53, at 217. 
59. See id at 219. 
60. Id at 220. 
61. Id 
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have not developed into a general doctrine of responsibility. There 
is, however, a project to reform the law in this respect. 
The proposed French reform would use a rigorous doctrine of 
identification to impose corporate criminal liability. It would permit 
identification only where the infraction was committed (1) by the 
deliberate decision of one of the corporate organs, (2) in its name, 
and (3) in the collective interest. This, in terms of French law, poses 
vexing questions concerning the notion of collective interest of the 
group wider than the group's personal interest.62 Although the spec-
ification of the responsible organ is appropriate to eliminate argu-
ments about whether a particular individual may be identified with 
the corporation, it does so at the price of a restrictive rule of liability, 
especially when it is necessary to prove that the directors not only 
made a deliberate decision, but also that they made it in the collec-
tive interest. American experience, particularly with antitrust of-
fenses, indicates that offenses are often the work of middle range 
officials responding to business pressures, in a way that the head of-
fice forbade. 63 And while there is bound to be doubt concerning 
what the ultimate controller's policy really was, there must be some 
cases where local managers operated in defiance of central policy. 
Considerations of this sort clearly influenced the decision of the 
Netherlands not to insist on so rigid a formula. Professor Fasseur 
argues: "Particularly in the case of large organizations, top execu-
tives are not always fully informed and cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to be so."64 He therefore considers it proper to prosecute the 
actual offenders as well. Whether a state of mind is to be imputed to 
a company, moreover, apparently depends on such familiar factors 
as the internal organization of the body and the tasks and responsi-
bilities assigned to the natural persons employed by it. 
The French formulation was seemingly influenced by realist no-
tions of the corporation.65 Certainly, it does not represent simply an 
attempt to distinguish between acts personal to the corporation and 
acts for which it may be held vicariously liable in a way th~t satisfies 
62. See Commission de Revision du Code Penal, Avant-Projet Definitif de Code Penal, 
Livre I (La Documentation Francaise 1978), Arts. 38 & 39; Delmas-Marty, supra note 8. Curi-
ously, this seems redolent of debates concerning locus standi in public interest legislation in the 
United States. However that may be, it is also doubtful in French law whether the collective 
interest would only include the interests of shareholders. Account ·may also be taken of the 
interests of creditors and workers. The emphasis on collective interest appears to be intended 
to protect employees and small shareholders. Id, commentary at 42; Delmas-Marty, supra 
note 8. · 
63. See Coffee, supra note 48, at 397. 
64. Fasseur, supra note 12, at 315. 
65. See Barbero Santos, supra note 5. 
1522 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 80:1508 
the internal necessities of the legal system. The French reform pro-
posals do, however, speak of a corporation as having a mind and will 
of its own. 66 
The absence of a general principle of corporate responsibility 
does not mean that the corporation cannot be reached by a variety of 
other penal sanctions. For example, corporations are not likely to 
escape at least some liability when natural persons, either employed 
by or directing the corporation, are convicted of a "corporate" 
wrong. In these cases, the usual range of disqualifications, forfeit-
ures, and confiscations will likely apply since the corporation can be 
held civilly liable for the infraction of the director or employee and 
may be made liable for all the civil consequences thereof, including 
tax fines or customs fines.67 Corporations are thus subjected to a 
wide measure of liability for offenses committed in their name. 
III. SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY 
A number of European countries, including Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and the European Economic Communities (EEC), provide 
for a wide measure of administrative liability. In Italy and Ger-
many, administrative liability alone is possible. Of Germany, Pro-
fessor Jescheck has concluded that the principal purpose of 
corporate criminal liability, which he identifies as reclaiming from 
corporations the profits that have accrued to them from crime, can 
be attained in other ways than through punishment. There are, how-
ever, administrative penalties against corporations. For public wel-
fare or administrative offenses ( Ordnungswidrigkeiten ), a fine may be 
66. See Avant-Projet Definitif de Code Penal, supra note 62, at 41. The proposed reform 
would limit liability to industrial, .financial, or commercial groups, but would include 
noncorporate bodies whose "reality" justifies criminal responsibility. Both these points are 
considered valid by Barbero Santos, who, profoundly influenced by the realist theory, believes 
that there should not be liability on the part of a corporation except for crimes that are appro-
priate to it (i.e., commercial or economic offenses in the case of a trading corporation), and that 
it should apply to all entities having real corporate personality. See Barbero Santos, supra 
note 5, at 478. 
It would J:je misplaced zeal to enter into a discussion of the forms of business organization 
in France and elsewhere with a view to determining which entities might be held criminally 
liable. It is enough perhaps to note that even on realist theories, a difficult problem of charac-
terization arises in determining which bodies are to be conceded corporate status for the pur-
pose of liability. Furthermore, there is the problem of determining whether the entity, 
corporate or not, has a collective will, or whether it would appear to the outsider. A further 
difficulty, felt by the French reformers, relates to the status of multinationals and group liabil-
ity. American and Canadian doctrine concurs in holding that any company may be liable 
provided that it has attributes of independence. Indeed, parent and subsidiary can conspire 
together on that theory. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sun Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 
1979). See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 322 U.S. 221 (1947); Regina v. Dominion 
Steel & Coal Corp., (1956] 116 C.C.C. 117 (Ont. High Ct.). 
67. MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 604-05 (remarks by Cosson). 
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imposed against a corporation whenever a representative organ of 
the corporation or a member of such an organ, commits an offense 
through which the obligations of the corporation have been improp-
erly performed, or the corporation has been unjustly enriched. A 
fine against the corporation or other legal person is also possible if 
no identified person can be convicted of the offense, or it is decided 
not to proceed against individuals.68 Professor Jescheck criticized 
this solution because he believes that fines are tainted with notions of 
guilt that are inappropriate to a legal person. He would, apparently, 
prefer a purely civil compensatory remedy for cases in which a legal 
entity has been unjustly enriched as the result of the actions of its 
organs. 
The existence of administrative liability might even suggest that 
the notion of administrative offenses is a purely semantic device, 
adopted to circumvent the prohibition against corporate guilt in the 
laws of Germany and Italy. Most German scholars, however, be-
lieve that there is a real distinction. First, administrative offenses are 
thought to be morally neutral. Second, they cannot be punished by 
imprisonment when the offender is a natural person. Nevertheless, I 
would agree with the position taken by Professor J escheck that such 
offenses cannot be deemed to be devoid of moral content. That fault 
finds no place in the formal definition of the offense does not imply 
that a person who commits such an offense can be assumed to have 
acted without moral fault. 
Administrative offenses or not, both the German laws and the 
competition rules of the European Economic Community provide 
for heavy penalties.69 Under the domestic laws of some European 
countries, moreover, a wide measure of sanctions in rem can be ap-
plied against offending businesses.70 Given the severity of such sanc-
tions and their quasi-penal nature, certain European scholars believe 
that they offer a sufficient means to control the activities of corpora-
tions, especially in the economic sphere.71 Thus, dogma cedes to the 
practical exigencies of law enforcement. 
68. See H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL. I am grateful 
to Mary Jeffries, B.A., for translating assistance. 
69. See Oehler, La Responsabilita Penale .Delle Persone Giuridiche Nella Comunita 
Economica Europea, in MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3 at 422-41; Tiedemann, Antitrust 
Law and Criminal Policy in Western Europe, in EcONOMIC CRIME IN EUROPE, (L. Leigh ed. 
1980). 
70. See National Reports cited in MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3; Screvens, supra note 
6, at 187-89. 
71. See H. JESCHECK, supra note 68; Huss, supra note 5, at 373. 
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IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST !NDMDUALS 
In Europe, there is a strong tendency to favor imposing sanctions 
against natural persons rather than corporations. In several coun-
tries, directors and others may be held liable for offenses that they 
ought to have prevented by reason of their position and function in 
the company.72 In Britain, directors' liability clauses apply to much 
of the modem regulatory legislation. Under these clauses, directors 
or officers of a corporation may be held liable for offenses committed 
by· the corporation, not only where the offense was committed with 
their consent or connivance, but also where it was attributable to 
their neglect. Liability also extends to a person who discharges this 
function in fact.73 Sometimes, the onus of proof is reversed, so that 
the director must show that he exercised due diligence to prevent 
commission of the offense. 74 It is striking that little practical use has 
been made of such provisions, 75 given the difficulty of proving that 
some person, other than the person whose mens rea and actus reus 
have been imputed to the company, directed, authorized, acquiesced 
in, or participated in the commission of the offense. Perhaps this is 
explained by the fact that one would still have to demonstrate the 
officer's responsibilities in the corporation to make out a prima facie 
case sufficient for the onus provision. Under English law, for exam-
ple, not every director or officer is regarded as having responsibility 
over any and all of the corporation's affairs. The United States Study 
Draft of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code sought to overcome 
these problems by imposing an additional duty on corporate officers 
to allocate responsibility for compliance as well as a duty to manage 
and supervise.76 Nevertheless, it would be difficult to do this, either 
by statute or by regulations, unless rigid management structures 
were required by corporate law. The draconian alternative would be 
to hold all corporate officers liable for all defaults. 
In addition to provisions such as these, European countries, in-
cluding Britain, use extensive disqualification provisions against di-
rectors who commit offenses of fraud, or even of negligence, in the 
72. See Delatte, supra note 19, at 283-84. 
13. See, e.g., Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 155; Consumer 
Safety Act, 1978, 38 § 7(4); Energy Act, 1976, ch. 76 § 18(4); Industry Act, 1975, ch. 68 § 34(6). 
14. See, e.g., Defence Production Act, 1968-1969, CAN. REv. STAT., ch. 62 § 21(5) (1973). 
75. In Britian there appear to be only two reported instances: Rex v. Yorkshire Elec. 
Board, The Times (London), Nov. 17, 19S1 at 3, col. 3; Edwards & Sons Ltd. v. M'Kinnon, 
1944 S.L.T. 120 (Justiciary). 
76. Staff Memoranda on Responsibility for Crimes Involving Corporations and Other Ar-
tificial Entities §§ 402-06 in 1 Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of the 
Federal Criminal Laws, 163, 187, n.73 (1970). 
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management of their corporations. Indeed, both natural persons and 
corporate bodies can, in many continental jurisdictions, be prohib-
ited from exercising a profession or engaging in certain aspects of 
professional practice.77 In Britain, a person who was convicted of an 
indictable offense in connection with the promotion, formation, 
management, or liquidation of a company, or who has been persist-
ently in default in relation to reporting requirements, or who has 
been guilty of fraudulent trading or of fraud in relation to the com-
pany or of any breach of duty as an officer, liquidator, receiver, or 
manager, may be disqualified from taking part, directly or indirectly, 
in the management of a company.78 A person who is convicted of 
fraud or dishonesty may be disqualified for a period of fifteen years; 
otherwise the maximum period of disqualification is five years. In 
addition, an undischarged bankrupt cannot be a director of a com-
pany,79 and a person who has been a director of two or more compa-
nies each of which became insolv~nt while he was a direct.or may 
also be disqualified by the court from acting as a director for as long 
as fifteen years in some instances.80 This strikes not only at incom-
petent directors, but also at those whose conduct is consistent with 
long-term frauds or other abstractions of corporate property. The 
Department of Trade, which is responsible for the enforcement of 
company legislation, indicates that when directors commit offenses 
of the sort noted above, the court is almost invariably asked to make 
a disqualification order, and does so. 81 
V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In the common-law systems, corporate criminal liability is an ac-
cepted principle. In continental systems it is not, save for the 
Netherlands, although France has formulated proposals for reform 
to this end and Belgium is beginning to do so. The European Eco-
nomic Community is also interested in developing an adequate sys-
tem of sanctions to confront the problems posed by large 
corporations, particularly in antitrust. The Messina symposium, 
11. See Bailly, in LES INTERDICTIONS PR0FESSI0NELLES (Cujas ed. 1969). See generally L. 
Leigh, Procedures and Sanctions in Respect of Economic Offences, Report to the 12th Confer-
ence of Directors of Criminological Institutes, Council of Europe, Strasbourg (1976). 
78. The British law has been consolidated in the Companies Act of 1981. Companies Act, 
1981, ch. 62, § 93. 
79. Companies Act, 1948, ch. 38, § 187. 
80. Insolvency Act, 1976, ch. 60, § 9 as amended by the Companies Act, 1981, ch. 62, § 93. 
For a criticism of similar suggestions in the United States, see Leibmann, Economic Crimes-
The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, 27 Bus. LAW. 177 (1971). 
81. See 10 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 88 (1981). 
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held under EEC auspices, concluded that the penal responsibility of 
legal persons that violate community norms should be recognized in 
the laws of all member states. The accent is clearly on workability, 
however, for the conclusions stated, rather agnostically, that each 
member state should work out "a system of repression (in the broad 
sense) covering sanctions of a penal, administrative, or specific na-
ture."82 As in the United States, the impetus for reform comes from 
fea;rs concerning the inability of states to control the economic power 
wielded by large groups and by multinational corporations. Scholars 
who advocate reform in Europe wish to have the power not only to 
fine a corporation, but also to subject it to other measures, for exam-
ple, closure of premises, disqualification from pursuing a prof es-
sional activity, confiscation, and more original still, placing the 
corporation under judicial supervision. 83 Dissolution has also been 
envisaged. 
Some of these sanctions can be imposed, indirectly if not directly, 
in European systems in which the rule of corporate irresponsibility 
exists, although corporate responsibility might make judicial super-
vision, divestiture, or the disgorging of profits easier. But corporate 
criminal responsibility is not necessarily the only way to cope with 
problems of economic power, or with the problem of proving of-
fenses by omission. Whether the range of sanctions is seen as penal 
or administrative in nature, the important point is that the sanctions 
be available. 
It is also important, whether full corporate criminal liability be 
admitted or not, that natural persons remain responsible. Liability 
should be cumulative, not substitutionary. There is, however, a con-
siderable moral problem since serious conduct must be labeled non-
criminal to reach the corporation. Under this arrangement, both the 
corporation and the natural person would have the solace of being 
convicted of what appears to be a morally neutral infraction. Per-
haps the answer to this problem is overlap in the legal system so that 
the natural person could be convicted of a crime, while the corpora-
tion is held liable only for an administrative offense. It would not be 
startling, for example, to create an administrative offense in respect 
of factory safety and yet still to punish natural persons criminally in 
the event of a serious injury or death. That often happens now. But 
it would be wrong not to convict the natural person of the graver 
82. MESSINA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 659-60. 
83. See id. at 230, 694; Avant-Projet Definitif de Code Penal, supra note 62, at 154. 
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offense if he can be identified and the burdens of criminal prosecu-
tion can be overcome. 
It is perhaps not surprising that European scholars look askance 
at common-law doctrines. If corporate criminal liability exists to 
force management to supervise the functioning of an enterprise, the 
purpose of such liability will differ little from that of vicarious liabil-
ity. The rules of liability for federal offenses in the United States are 
formulated in rather the same way. Unfortunately, this creates an 
anomalous exception: Enterprises that are not legal entities are not 
subjected to the supervisory duties imposed by traditional criminal 
offenses. There is thus an unresolved conflict between the needs of 
enforcement and legal dialectic. No one has yet sought to avoid or 
to minimize the conflict by extending vicarious liability to offenses of 
theft and deception; most common-law lawyers would reject the no-
tion peremptorily. It should occasion no surprise that scholars else-
where do so. Nor should it occasion surprise that scholars elsewhere 
refuse to treat liability ascribed through the identification or high 
managerial agent formula as truly personal. To say that mens rea 
may be ascribed to a corporation is not to say that a corporation has 
a mind, and European colleagues, who distrust our summary way of 
dealing with inconvenient concepts, may well object to founding 
doctrine either on crude anthropomorphism or on views of the real-
ity of a corporation that seem to them unpersuasive.84 To many Eu-
ropean scholars, though increasingly perhaps a minority among 
them, the common-law systems seem to have set the theoretical 
problems aside rather than to have solved them. 
It is, in other words, difficult to reconcile legal dogmas with the 
exigencies of enforcement in such a way as to preserve the internal 
consistency of the body of legal rules. Nor is the rather secular view 
of sanctions in the common-law systems reconcilable with the moral 
thrust of the European doctrine that emphasizes the personal nature 
of punishment. We may be content to have solved our problems 
with a metaphor; others conclude that the search for "corporateness" 
is misconceived from the start. Those who, like the French reform-
ers, seek a rule restricted to policy decisions at the highest level, may 
solve a formal problem in personal liability, but only at the cost of 
functional efficiency. The rule may be based, moreover, on a model 
too simple for the corporate structures of today, which are large and 
decentralized and leave major policy decisions to autonomous or 
nearly autonomous power centers. Although European scholars are 
84. See, e.g., H.L. Bolton Engr. Co. v. T.J. Graham & Sons, [1957] 1 Q.B. 152, 172 (C.A. 
1956). 
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aware of enforcement problems, they need more practical informa- · 
tion to guide their decision-making in law reform. 
We should not, however, conclude on a negative note. Economic 
crime is a subject of serious concern at governmental, industrial, and 
academic levels. In the process, European systems and common-law 
systems often throw up broadly similar rules, especially as regards 
sanctions against directors and officers, in rem procedures, and the 
like. It seems clear that there is a community of interest and a suffi-
cient similarity among fundamental ideas for each system to learn 
from the other, and, from a European point of view, there is every 
reason to believe that we can achieve a useful measure of harmoni-
zation as well. 
